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TOPICAL SURVEY
C. Transport
AVIATION - WARSAW CONVENTION - LIMITATION
OF AIR CARRIER'S LIABILITY - WHETHER
EMPLOYEES OF CARRIER ALSO PROTECTED
Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
The Warsaw Convention1 limits the liability of an air carrier for
damages sustained in the event of the death or injury of a passaneger
during an international flight. The question of whether the employees of
an airline are entitled to assert as a defense, the liability provisions of the
Convention, as modified by the Montreal Agreement of 1966,2 was decided
in the recent case of Reed v. Wiser.3
On September 8, 1974, a Trans-World Airlines flight from Tel Aviv to
New York crashed into the Ionian Sea west of Greece, killing all seventy-
nine passengers and nine crew members aboard. Instead of suing TWA,
whose liability would have been limited under the Convention, as
modified by the Montreal Agreement, to $75,000 per passenger,4 the
administrators and executors of one victim's estate sued TWA's President
and its Vice-President of Audit and Security. The plaintiffs alleged that
these two persons were responsible for security on TWA flights and had
negligently failed to prevent the placing of a bomb on board. The bomb
was then alleged to have exploded resulting in the crash and the death of
the passengers. Pursuant to a Multidistrict Litigation Panel ruling,5 this
suit and all other actions arising out of the crash were transferred to the
Southern District of New York for consolidated pretrial purposes. There,
the plaintiffs - personal representatives, heirs and next of kin of Dan
1. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No.
876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (adherence of United States proclaimed Oct. 29, 1934). The
Convention was the result of two international conferences - one held in Paris in
1925 and the second in Warsaw in 1929 - and of the work done by the Interim
Comite International Technique d'Experts Juridique Aeriens (CITEJA)[hereinafter
referred to and cited as the Convention].
2. Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention
and the Hague Protocol, Agreement CAB 18900, Approved, CAB Order No.
E-23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966), reprinted in 49 U.S.C.A. § 1502 note. The effect
of the Montreal Agreement was to raise the limit of liability from $8,300 to $75,000,
including costs of litigation, without regard to fault on the part of the carrier.
3. 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
4. The Convention, supra note 1, at art. 25, para. 2. This limit applies unless
the plaintiff can show that the defendant engaged in wilful misconduct. Id.
5. 407 F. Supp. 238 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976).
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William Reed - moved to strike the defense of limited liability provided
by the Convention. This motion was granted by the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York, 6 thus certifying to the Circuit Court of
Appeals the question of whether defendant employees, Forwood Cloud
Wiser, Jr., and Richard E. Neuman, were entitled to the protection
provided by the monetary limits of the Convention as modified by the
Montreal Agreement.
The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs could not recover from
either the airline's employees or the airline and its employees together, an
amount greater than that able to be recovered in a suit against the airline
itself. The import of the appellate decision in Reed v. Wiser is significant
in light of the spate of conflicting decisions and opinions which have
clouded this area over the years.
In Wanderer v. Sabena,7 the plaintiff, while a passenger on an aircraft
owned and operated by Sabena, was injured in an accident near Gander,
Newfoundland, enroute from Brussels to New York. Two years after
instituting suit against Sabena, the plaintiff served a supplemental
summons and amended complaint on Pan-American Airways, Inc.,
naming that corporation as an additional defendant in the action. The
complaint alleged that Pan-American controlled the operations of the
defendant Sabena at Gander Airport and that when the airplane
crashed, it was being controlled by both defendants. Furthermore, the
complaint charged Pan-American with negligence in failing to instruct
the pilot to proceed to another airfield where weather conditions were
more favorable than those in Gander at the time of the accident. Pan-
American Airways moved to dismiss the complaint against itself on the
ground that the cause of action did not accrue within the time for
commencement of suit as provided in article 29 of the Warsaw
Convention. The plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that this two
year limitation was inapplicable because Pan-American was not the
carrier under the contract of transportation. The court held that the
plaintiffs cause of action was governed by the Warsaw Convention,
reasoning that the provisions of the Convention, where applicable, apply
to the agencies employed to perform the carriage as well as the carrier
itself. Therefore, failure to institute an action against Pan-American
Airways within the time prescribed by the Convention extinguished
plaintiffs claim against Pan-American. This case has been criticized on
6. 414 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
7. [1949] U.S. Aviation Rep. 25 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1949).
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many occasions but generally for the reason that Pan-American Airways
should not have been regarded as Sabena's agent."
Wanderer v. Sabena was cited approvingly in Chutter v. KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines.9 In that case, the plaintiff, after boarding the plane but
while the plane was still stationary, decided to return to the airport
terminal. She stepped through the open airplane door expecting to
descend from the plane on the same boarding ramp she had used to enter
the plane. Unfortunately the ground service company had already
removed the ramp and the plaintiff fell to the ground. More than two
years after the accident a suit was filed against both the airline and the
ground service company. The court in Chutter held that the service
company, which was acting as an agent for KLM at the time of the
accident, could claim the benefit of the time limitation set out in the
Convention. The court supported its decision by drawing a favorable
analogy to two U.S. Circuit Court cases 0 which involved the related
industry of water transportation and were governed by the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act."
In these cases the limitation provisions of the Act were held to inure
to the benefit of a stevedore, independently contracted for by the carrier.
The reasoning of the courts is captured in one statement wherein it was
posited, "[T]he stevedore is engaged by the carrier to perform a part of the
contract of carriage from the group of persons whose joint activity is the
carrier's activity.' 2 The court in Chutter thought that the analogy of the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act was made even more persuasive by the fact
that the "Carriage of Goods by Sea Act merely refers to the liability of the
carrier while the Warsaw Convention, in Article 24, refers to an action for
damages (for passenger bodily injury) 'however founded.' 13
Four years after the Chutter decision was handed down, the U.S.
Supreme Court reviewed the treatment and status of agents under the Act
in the case of Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp.14 The
Court held in part that the absence from the language, legislative history,
or environment of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of anything
expressly or impliedly indicating any intention of Congress to regulate
8. Lacombe, Jurisprudence, Court Supreme de l'Etat de New York, 12 REV.
GEN. DE L'AIR 821 (1949); LeGoff, La Jurisprudence des Etats Unis sur
V'application de la Convention de Varsovie, 20 REV. GEN. DE L'AIR 352, 354 (1957).
9. 132 F. Supp 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
10. A.M. Collins & Co. v. Panama R. Co., 197 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1952); United
States v. The South Star, 210 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1954).
11. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the Act.
12. 132 F. Supp. at 613.
13. Id.
14. 359 U.S. 297 (1959).
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
stevedores or other agents of a carrier or to limit their liability,
established that such agents are not "carriers" whose liability to the
shipper is limited.'5 Herd specifically overruled one of the cases relied
upon in Chutter and implicitly overruled the other. 16 In so doing the Court
stated, "We can only conclude that if Congress had intended to make
such an inroad on the rights of the claimants (against negligent agents) it
would have said so in unambiguous terms, and in the absence of a clear
Congressional policy to that end, we cannot go so far.' '17
Following the High Court's interpretation of the Act, one district
court reached a similar result in a case involving an air carrier.'8 The
extent to which the court relied on the Supreme Court's decision is
unclear. It appears that the district court opinion rested primarily upon
the fact that the United States had failed to ratify the 1955 Hague
Protocol which would have, among other things, amended the Conven-
tion so as to extend the liability limitations to airline employees and
agents. 19
In deciding to extend the Convention's liability limitations to
employees of air carriers, the court in Reed v. Wiser began by recognizing
that the purpose of the Warsaw Convention's article 22 liability limitation
was to fix at a definite level the cost to airlines of damages sustained by
their passengers and of insurance to cover such damage. In a 1934 letter
to the President setting forth the terms of the Convention, former
Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote:
It is believed that the principle of limitation of liability will not only
be beneficial to passengers and shippers as affording a more definite
15. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) sets the limit at $500 per package.
16. 197 F.2d at 893.
17. 359 U.S. at 302.
18. Pierre v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957).
19. International Conference on Private Air Law, the Hague, September, 1955,
Minutes 216 (ICAO Doc. 7686-LC/140 1956). Art. 25A provides:
1. If an action is brought against a servant or agent of the carrier
arising out of damage to which this Convention relates, such servant or
agent, if he proves that he acted within the scope of his employment, shall
be entitled to avail himself of the limits of liability which that carrier
himself is entitled to invoke under Art. 22.
2. The aggregate of the amounts recoverable from the carrier, his
servants and agents in that case, shall not exceed the said limits.
3. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article shall not apply
if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act of omission of the
servant or agent done with intent to cause damages or recklessly and with
knowledge that damage would probably result.
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basis of recovery and as tending to lessen litigation, but that it will
prove to be an aid in the development of air transportation, as such
limitation will afford the carrier a more definite basis on which to
obtain insurance rates, with the probable result that there would
eventually be a reduction of operating expenses for the carrier and
advantages to travelers and shippers in the way of reduced
transportation charges. 20
The Reed court rejected the argument that limits were no longer
needed to protect air travel as an infant industry and instead reiterated
that although an increase in the amount of the limit has been required as
the airline industry has matured, safety records have improved, and
worldwide inflation has increased. "[A~t no time has this country ever
abandoned the basic principle that, whatever the limits may be, air
carriers should be protected from having to pay out more than a fixed and
definite sum for passenger injuries sustained in international air
disasters." 21 It is evident that if a claimant is allowed to sue a carrier's
employees for an unlimited amount of damages the express purpose of
article 22 would be frustrated and plaintiffs would be able to recover from
the carrier, damages in excess of Convention limits.
As a result of such a conclusion, the carrier would be forced to insure
against his servant's unlimited liability and the cost of operating an
airline would be adversely affected. Not only would insurance premiums
increase directly with the size of potential damage awards, but increased
and more complex litigation would also ensue, pushing insurance rates
even higher. These increases would be passed on in the form of
substantially higher transportation charges. This result is the very thing
which the signatories of the Convention sought to guard against in the
first instance.
The court did not, however, rely solely upon the argument that the
provisions of the Warsaw Convention should be interpreted "so as to
effectuate their purposes. '22 It stated that in the absence of any definition
of the term "transporteur" (carrier), the Convention was intended to act
as a uniform international aviation law, in the manner espoused in Block
20. S. EXEC. Doc. No. G, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934), quoted in Reed v. Wiser,
555 F.2d at 1089.
21. 555 F.2d at 1089.
22. Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804, 812 (2d Cir. 1966), where
the court laid down general guidelines for interpretation of the Convention. See
also, Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1975) and Block
v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 336-57 (5th Cir. 1967).
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v. Compagnie Nationale Air France,23 and should be read in the context
of the national legal systems of all its members, not just under the U.S.
common law, where liability of the wrongdoing agent is a separate source
of redress from that of the principal.
As an illustration, the French jurist Lemoine based his interpretation
of the Convention on the principle of identification of the carrier with his
servants. 24 Throughout the text of the Convention acts of the carrier and
his servant are considered in a unified context. The French Air
Navigation Act of 1925 does not allow the carrier to avoid liability for his
own acts but does enable him to shut off vicarious liability. How then,
argues Lemoine, can it be that under the Convention, a carrier's liability
is limited but his servants are exposed to unlimited liability, when unlike
the French Act, there has been no attempt to draw a distinction between a
carrier's acts and those of his servants.
As a further justification for its decision the court indicated that the
"however founded clause" in article 24 should be read expansively so as
to prevent circumvention of the Convention's provisions. This position
was suggested by Lemoine and later more fully articulated by Professor
H. Drion.25 Article 24 reads in pertinent part, "In the cases covered by
articles 18 and 19 any action for damages, however founded, can only be
brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this Convention."
[emphasis added] The clause was interpreted by the court to mean that
regardless of whether the action is founded in tort or contract, whether in
domestic or foreign law, the limitations and conditions of the Convention
apply. The court specifically noted that an interpretation which allowed
actions to be brought against airline employees for amounts greater than
would be recoverable from the airline itself would defeat the Convention's
fundamental objective of creating a uniform system of liability and
litigation rules for international air disasters.
The court dismissed the plaintiffs argument that the case should be
governed by the refusal of the United States to ratify the Hague Protocol,
which expressly extended the Convention's liability limits to a carrier's
employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment. With
reference to the Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations,
26
the court indicated that the United States' refusal to ratify the Protocol
was caused by the Protocol's failure to provide a sufficient increase in the
23. 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967).
24. M. LEMOINE, TRAIT9 DE DROIT AgRIEN 558 (1947).
25. H. DRION, LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW 152-58
(1954).
26. Hague Protocol to Warsaw Convention: Hearings Before the Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. on Exec. H, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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liability limits, rather than by its express application of these limits to a
carrier's employees.
27
The court disposed of the Supreme Court's refusal in Robert C. Herd
& Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp., 28 to extend similar liability limitation
provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act to stevedores or other
agents by distinguishing Herd on the grounds that the Act explicitly
defines the term "carrier" and thereby excludes independent stevedoring
companies. 29 In addition, the court stated that "the COGSA, unlike the
Convention, must be read against the common law and contains no
requirement that 'any action for damages, however founded, can only be
brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this Conventi-
on.' ,,30 Moreover, the court felt there was no evidence to show that the
carriers governed by the Act (unlike the carriers under the Convention)
ever need reimburse independent stevedoring companies for the negli-
gence of a company's employees.
Reed v. Wiser is a significant decision. It is the first definitive
pronouncement on the question of an air carrier's vicarious liability to be
handed down by a United States circuit court of appeals. Moreover, that
particular circuit, the second, has historically been a key battleground for
such lawsuits. A conflict still remains among the circuits of the United
States, and until the Convention is formally amended and ratified by the
United States, such conflicts can be expected to continue. This is
particularly unfortunate in light of the high stakes which are frequently
involved in suits against air carriers. The court's opinion in the instant
case does, however, contain a good analysis of the relevant considera-
tions and is a well suppported decision.
Victoria A. Steffen
27. 555 F.2d at 1086.
28. 359 U.S. 297 (1959).
29. 46 U.S.C. § 1301(a).
30. 555 F.2d at 1093.
